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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the residual Government ownership, performance and value creation on the post 
privatization period. The results reveal that very high levels of government ownership are associated with an increase in 
performance and value creation within the privatized company, while low levels of this ownership are associated with a decrease 
in performance and value creation. Our paper highlights also the important role of cognitive governance in determining 
performance and value creation within privatized companies. 
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1. Introduction 
Although privatization has very former origins, the controversy on the subject continues today (Astami, EW et al, 
2010; Clarke et al, 2009; Ghosh, 2010; Arin & Ulubasoglu, 2009, Huang & Wang, 2010). 
This debate has been reopened recently because of the need for government ownership in enterprises (Boubakri 
et al. 2009, Omran 2009; A. Ng et al, 2009; Boubakri & al. 2011; Wu, H.-L. (2010)). In fact, although the idea that 
the role of the state must be a minimum for better economic growth was dominant for a long time among many 
economists and policymakers, the recent economic and financial crisis came to shake this dogma. 
Thus, the last two years have been marked by the comeback of the state in market management following the 
recent financial crisis. The nationalization of banks has become necessity in Europe and the United States. This 
phenomenon invites reflection on the impact of privatization versus state ownership on the performance and to a 
genuine reading of these processes. 
What is still surprising is that some recent studies, have shifted their analysis to the consideration of the residual 
public ownership effect on the value creation and performance in privatized firms (Ng et al 2009; Boubakri et al 
2009, Guedhami et al 2009). Our research is among those focused on such a question in the case of privatized 
French companies. 
French privatizations began in 1986 and since then it has formed one of the most important global programs, 
whether in terms of the number of transactions or the importance of sales (Jones & al. 1999; Bortolotti & al. 1998; 
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Charreaux & Alexander, 2004). Despite the increasing abundance of empirical studies on privatization impact on 
corporate performance, little work has been devoted to privatization in France (Albouy & Obeid, 2007 and 
Alexander & Charreaux, 2004). 
While Alexander & Charreaux (2004), has observed in the French case a non-significant increase in performance 
which, in addition when it occurred, is observed prior to privatization; Albouy & Obeid, (2007) has concluded on a 
positive impact of privatization on performance.  However, none of these works has studied the impact of the 
residual state ownership on performance. Since, these privatizations are in most cases partial as the state continues 
to have residual ownership shares within these companies. So, it will be interesting to provide answers to the 
following questions: 
What is the impact of residual public ownership on performance and value creation within the privatized 
company? And what are its determinants? In other words, what are the reasons that spur the government to keep 
public ownership shares in some companies over others? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section one presents a brief survey of the empirical literature. 
Section 2 describes our sample and variables. While section 3 presents and discusses our investigation and empirical 
findings. And we are going to conclude in section 4. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypotheses 
The studies on the impact of privatization on performance have led to results, although heterogeneous, advocated  
mostly in favor of a positive one (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Boubakri & al. 2009; Huang & Wang, 2010 and 
Alexander & Charreaux, 2004).  
As far as public enterprises pursue objectives that frequently conflict with the objective of maximizing profit, the 
level of shares held by the state within the newly privatized firms should affect the change in the performance. 
Holding public ownership shares even a minority within privatized firms, deserves special attention. In fact 
research on the impact of the public ownership in such companies have led to conflicting results because of 
imprecise roles he plays either as a minority or majority owner.  
Despite its remedy to the market failure, the structure of public ownership can channel political interference in 
decision-making at the management level, thus generate multiple objectives and often contradictory in the company 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and may even be inconsistent with the maximization of corporate value. Nevertheless, 
several empirical studies have corroborated the role of passive public property when it is reduced to a minority 
(Pistor & Turkewitz, 1996; D'Souza et al. 2001; Wu, 2007). However, several empirical studies proclaimed the 
effect of public ownership on corporate performance (Shirley & Walsh, 2001; Megginson & Netter, 2001, Ng & al, 
2009; Wu, 2010).  
Thus, the structure of public ownership whether a minority or a majority within privatized enterprises provides an 
private sector regardless of governmental control imposed directly on public companies. 
The literature suggests that governments are more likely to pay attention to non-trade objectives such as 
maximizing social welfare, and reducing producer prices (Hart & al, 1990; Laffont & Tirole, 1993). Admittedly, 
such ownership structure in the privatized company integrates both social objectives in addition to the maximizing 
value objectives. Hence, it would be interesting to test the extent of such impact. 
Claessens & al (1997) argue that, if the state holds a majority stake, the company is more likely to delay 
restructuring and maintain high levels of employment. This same view was also shared by Thomsen & Pedersen 
(2000), who found in the case of European firms, that firms lose value when the government is the largest owner. 
Meanwhile, D'Souza & Megginson (1999), Boubakri & Cosset (1998), and Eckel, Eckel & Singal (1997) reported 
large improvements in the effectiveness in privatizations in which the government does not have the majority of 
control.  
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In the case of Russia, Earle & Estrin (1997) found no significant difference between the performance of public 
and private companies. For while Mongolia, Anderson & al (2000) reported superior performances of public 
ownership on the private ownership, thereby proving that public companies work better than private companies. 
Nevertheless, studies of Wei & Varela (2003) and Wei & al. (2005) on a sample of privatized Chinese companies 
concluded simultaneously on a convex relationship between the state ownership and market performance which 
imply that both high and low shares of ownership are associated with higher performance. This is being in 
contradiction with those reported by Sun & al. (2002) who have found a concave relationship between state 
ownership and market performance, thereby implying that both high and low state properties are associated with 
poorer market performance. Thus we can close that the question of the relationship between government ownership 
and performance has not been resolved in the literature of privatization. 
Ng, A & al (2009) found in a sample of 4315 Chinese privatized firms over the period 1996 -2003, that the strong 
structure of state ownership is associated with a strong performance after privatization. Their results confirm the 
existence of a convex relationship between state ownership and performance. However, they found a lower 
performance for mixed ownership firms compared to those controlled by the state and those controlled by private, 
view that first show competing ownership structures: state ownership, legal ownership, and public ownership. 
Therefore, a dispersed ownership structure is probably present, thus creating problems of low motivation on the part 
of shareholders in the control and supervision of the firm. They also showed that, besides the concentration of 
ownership and the balance of power, ownership structure, whether public or private matter jointly in determining 
performance.  
Based on the arguments cited above, public ownership can give two contradictory signals about the value of the 
company: on one hand, the gain of the investo
in terms of its access to financial resources and institutional knowledge; and on the other hand, the risk of political 
interference that may arise from the presence of such public ownership. 
Given these mixed effects of public ownership, we will assume that this relationship may reflect a curvilinear 
relationship, such that the value of the firm first increases (due to the confidence of investors) then decreases as the 
level of state ownership increases (due to the risk of political interference).  
Hence, the following hypothesis: With reference to the results of previous work we assume the existence of a 
nonlinear relationship between state ownership and performance of the privatized company. This relationship is then 
concave. 
3. Data and Sample Description 
 Our study covers the period 1987 - 2009 and focuses on the post privatization period (five years after 
privatization) of 31 French financial and non financial companies.  
In fact, the transition of the company from public sector to the private sector knows several modalities; one of 
these modalities is privatization through the stock exchange. Like the majority of previous studies (among others, 
Alexander & Charreaux, 2004, Megginson & al. 2004; Boubakri & al. 2005), we are interested in this study to 
companies privatized through this modality. 
The Privatization Barometer database counts 145 privatizations in France; however, based on our definition of 
privatization, as the transfer of ownership from the public sector to the private sector we have 45 operations. This 
number was reduced to 31 for two essential reasons: the first is due to lack of data on previously privatized 
companies; the second is due to the phenomena of mergers and acquisitions. Are also excluded companies whose 
privatization took place after 2004 such as EDF, AREVA CI, ALSTOM SA, ICADE, etc, because the study requires 
tization.  
Although the basics "Thomson Financial", "ORBIS" and "Worldscope" are the sources of our accounting data, 
we referred to annual reports to supplement or correct the information from databases.  
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Table.1. Summary of variables and selected measures 
 
Variable Abreviation Measures Bibliographic references 
Measures of  performance and Value Creation 
Return on Equity ROE Net profit / Total Equity Omran, M. (2009) ; 
Return on Assets 
 
ROA Operating Income / Total assets Alexandre & Charreaux (2004) ; 
Laura, C. G & Silvia G., A. (2007); 
Omran , M. (2009) 
 
Stock Performance  (Market capitalization + 
Financial debts)/ Total assets 
Wei, Z. & Varela, O. (2003) ; A. Ng 
& al. (2009), Omran, M. (2009) 
 
Ownership variable 
State ownership STATE % of capital directly or indirectly held 
by the state 
Wei & Varela (2003),    A. Ng & al. 
(2009) 
Control variables 
Firm size SIZE Log of turnover Boubakri & al. (2005) ; 
Mak & Kusandi (2002) ; 
Villalonga (2000). 
Belonging to the CAC40 CAC Binary variable=1 if the firm  is part of the 
CAC40 index , and 0 otherwise. 
Alexandre & Charreaux (2004) 
Strategic Industries IND STR Binary variable =1 if the firm is one of the 8 
strategic sectors  and 0 otherwise. 
Boubakri & al (2009) ;  Ng & 
al. (2009) 
Leverage LEVERAGE Debt ratio = Total liabilities/Total assets Ng & al. (2009) ;  Sun & al 
(2002) 
Industry IND Binary variable = 1 if the firm is non 
financial and 0 if the firm is a bank or an 
insurance. 
Alexandre & Charreaux 
(2004) ; Knyazeva, A & al 
(2006). 
Source : author compilation 
4. Empirical investigation and results 
4.1.  Descriptive analysis of variables 
Table.2. Summary of variables and selected measures 
 
 
Variables 
Means Median Min Max Std.Dev Obs 
 0.829 0.549 0.003 5.817 0.953 155 
ROA 0.068 0.057 -0.131 0.53 0.088 155 
ROE 0.138 0.101 -5.556 2.759 0.641 155 
STATE 0.107 0 0 0.636 0.187 155 
SIZE 3.739 3.927 2.201 4.668 0.597 155 
Leverage 0.953 0.721 0.309 9.210 1.379 155 
 
 
 Referring to N. Boubakri et al. (2009) we consider as strategic sectors related to the financial productions, mining 
and steel, telecommunications, transport, oil production and  military nature. 
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This table presents descriptive statistics of some variables of our study over the period: 1987-2009: means, 
median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation. Our regression models are estimated on panel data. The 
number of observations is 155. 
Accordingly, 50% of French companies hold public ownership shares after privatization. Thus, the average 
percentage of ownership shares held by the government during this period is 10.7%. 
Accounting measures and stock market performance have an average of less than 1. This could reflect a low level 
of economic and financial performance for firms in our sample. Nevertheless the average value of Tobin's Q remains 
relatively high. 
 The average debt of privatized French companies is relatively high. Similarly, as evidenced by the standard 
deviation, the amplitude of variation is too high; this could involve a dispersion of the level of debt in these 
companies. We also note that the average size of the company exceeds widely the 1, thus displaying a large size of 
the companies studied; also this size is fairly uniform in general. 
4.2. Correlation matrix and VIF test 
To circumvent the multicollinearity problem, we will study bi- varied correlations between explanatory variables. 
The table.3 outlines the various correlations. It indicates that the level of correlation between independent variables 
is low. This result was corroborated by the VIF test whose values are below 2.37. 
Table.3: Correlation Matrix and VIF test  
 STATE STATE2 IND LEV   ROA   CAC SIZE VIF 
STATE     1        1.48 
STATE2  1      1.24 
IND     0.230   0.228 1     1.43 
LEV     -0.078 -0.089 -0.402    1           1.87 
ROA     -0.152 0.399 0.206   -0.16   1   2.30 
CAC40       0.128    -0.052 0.256   -0.15  -0.19    1  2.06 
SIZE       0.278   -0.073 0.059      0.21  -0.38    0.580  1 2.37 
4.3. Multivariate analysis 
To circumvent the multicollinearity problem, we will study bi- varied correlations between explanatory variables. 
The table.3 outlines the various correlations. It indicates that the level of correlation between independent variables 
is low. This result was corroborated by the VIF test whose values are below 2.37. 
The model tested is as follows: 
          0  
X represents the set of control variables including ROA, the firm size, industry, leverage and belonging or not to 
the CAC40 for measuring the value (Tobin's Q); and firm size, industry and the CAC40 for measures of accounting 
performance (ROA, ROE). Estimates were made by the method of generalized least squares panel data on STATA.  
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According to Ng et al (2009), several previous studies  have shown that there is a nonlinear (concave versus 
convex) relationship between the structure of state ownership and market performance. In our present study we 
assumed the existence of a concave relationship.  
We perform the estimation in two stages. In a first step we will test the relationship between state ownership 
(STATE) on accounting performance (ROA, ROE) as well as market performance (Tobin's Q); and in a second step, 
we introduce the quadratic effect of the state ownership variable.  
 
Table.4: Regression of stock market performance on the residual state ownership 
Note: *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Table.5 Regression of accounting measures of performance on the residual state ownership 
 
 
 Wei & Varela, 2003;Wei & al., 2005; et Sun & al., 2002. 
 
Dependant Variables (1) 
Q de Tobin 
(2) 
Q de Tobin 
Independant Variables   
 
Constante 
 
1.44 *** 
(3.05) 
 
 
1.47*** 
( 3.10) 
STATE 
 
-1.17 *** 
(-3.56) 
-1.79*** 
(- 4.92) 
 
STATE 2  2.05** 
(2.40) 
 
ROA 
 
5.07*** 
(3.08) 
6.12*** 
(3.94) 
 
SIZE 
 
-0,39*** 
(-3.12) 
 
-0.42*** 
(-3.25) 
IND 
 
 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
 
0.34*** 
(2.97) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.027 
(1.63) 
 
0.03** 
(2.05) 
CAC 
 
0.23 
(1.43) 
0.23 
(1.48) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.40 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROE ROE 
     
STATE -0.053 
(-1.43) 
-0.182*** 
(-4.90) 
 
-0.741*** 
(-2.60) 
-1.327*** 
(-4.24) 
 
STATE2  0.474*** 
(6.94) 
 
 2.188*** 
(3.80) 
 
IND 0.059*** 
(3.40) 
 
0.044*** 
(2.88) 
0.182 
(1.36) 
0.111 
(0.86) 
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The results in table.4 and table.5, lead us to corroborate the nonlinearity of the relationship since the model's 
explanatory power has improved during the second estimate for both Tobin's Q (R2 increased from 0.38 to 0.4), 
ROA (R2 increased from 0.21 to 0.41) and ROE (R2 increased from 0.11 to 0.19) as well as the significances and 
values of the coefficients.  
So the relationship between state ownership and company performance is examined through the STATE and 
STATE2 variables. They will represent together the shape of this relationship. 
and significant coefficient at less than 1% (0%). 
STATE2 is positively and significantly related to performance at less than 5% for the Tobin's Q and less than 1% 
for ROA and ROE. This implies that a high state ownership is linked to an increased value for the privatized firm. 
Obviously, with a negative and significant STATE, and a positive and significant STATE2, the relationship 
between state ownership and performance in privatized French companies is a convex one. 
These results are consistent with those found by Wei & Varela (2003), Wei & al. (2005) and Ng & al (2009) but 
are in contradiction with those of Sun & al (2002), who found instead a concave relationship. So, our hypothesis that 
has assumed the existence of a concave relationship rather than convex is rejected in spite of these results. 
Thus, one can deduce that the structure of public ownership is initially negatively related to performance but 
from a point of inflection, the relationship changes to become positive. 
Hence it has been argued by Ng & al. (2009), that for high levels of ownership structure, whether public or 
private, there will be clearly structures of ownership and control rights which would have a positive impact on 
performance. The same authors also argued that state control gives profits into these firms.  
The size variable (SIZE) is highly significant at the 1% level and is negatively related to stock performance and 
accounting performance (ROA) with the respective coefficients of -0.42 and -0035. This result is consistent with 
most of the conclusions reached by previous research which stipulate that broadest privatized enterprises are 
associated with weaker performance, insofar as they find it more difficult to adapt to new economic and political 
context and are associated with higher agency costs. In addition they face the highest government bureaucracy. 
The variable LEVERAGE is weakly related to Tobin's Q (0.03) is positive and significant at 5%. This result is 
partially consistent with Ng & al (2009) conclusion , who found a positive and significant coefficient (at 1% level) 
over one period of his study and a negative effect on another period. Indeed, several arguments can be advanced to 
explain this result. The explanation given by Ng & al (op.cit) is the fact that high levels of debt in state owned firms 
make that this variable would have little impact on the market performance. Nevertheless, we can attribute this 
finding to the fact that debt can be considered as a mechanism to discipline the manager. Creditors may thus control 
 
 They have led in their estimates to mixed results about the relationship between Tobin's Q and debt. The 
coefficient of the variable is positive and significant in one year, negative and significant on another and it is not 
significant on the remaining period. Hence on the whole, there is a weak evidence of a debt negative effect on 
market performance. 
CAC 
 
-0.008 
(-0.50) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
-0.165 
(-1.29) 
-0.150 
(-1.23) 
 
 
SIZE -0.052*** 
(-3.72) 
 
-0.035*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.133 
(-1.25) 
-0.061 
(-0.58) 
 
Constant 0.223*** 
(4.35) 
0.165*** 
(3.63) 
0.639 
(1.62) 
0.380 
(0.99) 
 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Number of t 5 5 5 5 
R2  (%) 21.54 40.70 11.06 18.90 
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the executive and limit his opportunistic behavior. By increasing debt, managers will be under more financial 
burdens and also have less free cash flows that are stared at as a source of conflict and risk. 
Accounting performance measured by ROA is the most strongly and positively variable related to market 
performance (  = 6.12) with high level (1%) of significance. This coefficient is much higher than other variables, 
particularly the STATE and STATE2 variables. 
 This empirical result clearly shows that accounting performance runs strong market performance. The operating 
performance is strongly tied to stock performance among French companies. Such a result is supported by the 
almost of previous empirical work. 
 Regarding the variable IND, it is found positively and significantly related (at 1%) to market performance 
So the 
fact that the privatized French company is not a bank or insurance would make it more associated with higher levels 
of performance.  
Finally, the variable CAC was found no significantly associated to all measures of performance. So the fact that a 
company is belonging to the CAC40 index or not, have no effect on its performance and on its value creation.  
4.4. Cross-sectional analysis 
The same relationships were also analyzed cross sections for the five years following privatization. The 
underlying motivation of such an approach is to better understand the nature of such an impact by pursuing a more 
fine its annual development.  
 
Table.6 Cross-sectional regression of accounting performance (ROA) on the State ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
      
STATE 0.023 
(0.32) 
-0.135* 
(-2.02) 
-0.221** 
(-2.38) 
-0.276** 
(-2.75) 
-0.267** 
(-2.43) 
 
STATE2 0.059 
(0.45) 
 
0.354*** 
(3.04) 
0.544*** 
(3.12) 
0.720*** 
(3.86) 
0.973*** 
(4.50) 
 
IND 0.037 
(1.19) 
 
0.062** 
(2.13) 
0.060 
(1.62) 
0.046 
(1.23) 
0.010 
(0.27) 
 
CAC -0.002 
(-0.06) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.36) 
-0.004 
(-0.11) 
0.011 
(0.32) 
-0.016 
(-0.44) 
 
SIZE -0.050** 
(-2.16) 
 
-0.027 
(-1.14) 
-0.031 
(-1.03) 
-0.029 
(-0.97) 
-0.021 
(-0.67) 
 
Constant 0.213** 
(2.51) 
0.127 
(1.45) 
0.141 
(1.27) 
0.126 
(1.12) 
       0.140 
       (1.19) 
      
Observations 31 31 31 31            31 
R-squared 0.288 0.505 0.461 0.511          0.580 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table.7 Cross-sectional regression of accounting performance (ROE) on the State ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
      
STATE 
 
-0.051 
(-0.22) 
-0.365** 
(-2.10) 
-0.817 
(-1.20) 
-0.763 
(-1.04) 
-5.450*** 
(-4.43) 
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STATE2 0.316 
(0.76) 
 
0.969*** 
(3.20) 
1.317 
(1.03) 
1.360 
(1.00) 
5.660** 
(2.33) 
 
IND 
 
0.152 
(1.52) 
 
0.033 
(0.44) 
0.248 
(0.92) 
0.158 
(0.58) 
0.038 
(0.09) 
CAC 
 
-0.076 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.041 
(-0.56) 
-0.200 
(-0.77) 
-0.102 
(-0.39) 
-0.255 
(-0.63) 
SIZE 
 
0.039 
(0.53) 
 
-0.071 
(-1.15) 
-0.070 
(-0.31) 
-0.111 
(-0.50) 
0.019 
(0.05) 
Constant -0.160 
(-0.58) 
0.404* 
(1.79) 
0.407 
(0.50) 
0.529 
(0.64) 
0.224 
(0.17) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.151 0.474 0.173 0.141 0.554 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results, in Table.6 and Table.7, do reveal that the signs of the STATE and STATE2 coefficients are the same 
as those found in the "pooled" estimates, only these coefficients are not significant over the entire study period. 
STATE is significant on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years after privatization to the respective levels of 1%, 1% and 5%. By 
cons, this variable is found insignificant at the 1st and 5th years after privatization. This implies that the structure of 
state ownership has a positive impact on the market value of the privatized company, over the entire period except 
for the 1st and 5th years after privatization. 
These results further confirm the convex relationship found in previous estimates between the residual state 
ownership and performance. Moreover, one can draw the fact that the structure of the state, even for high levels, can 
be beneficial to the privatized company and did not always have a negative effect as it was corroborated by the 
majority of previous research. 
Thus, we can stand out from these estimates, that neither the variable STATE, nor its quadratic form (STATE2) 
has a significant impact during the first year after privatization on different measures of performance. This impact is 
more pronounced during the 2nd and 3rd years on 
5th year on the economic performance (ROA), where it is negative and significant. Whereas, for the performance 
measure (ROE), it is significant only during the 2nd and 5th years.  
Regarding the quadratic form STATE2, it is found positive with all measures of performance. However, its effect 
is highly significant (at 1% level) on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th years with the ROA. Concerning other measures of 
performance, the impact of this variable keeps the same sign, but it is significant only during the 4th and 5th years 
profitability (ROE).  
So we can highlight the conclusion that the positive effect of a strong state participation is strengthened by 
advancing in years on the post privatization period. We can justify this by referring to some studies** and theories 
that have reported the existence of externalities or learning effects in organizations involving different stakeholders. 
In fact, the value creation within the privatized company through cognitive transfer has been ignored by previous 
work. Vermeulen & Barkema (2001) had argued on this matter, that the acquisition of another company bring new 
knowledge and new resources. We can extend this argument and highlight the fact that the resumption of a public 
company by the private is source of large inputs and diverse skills. Such an effect may become more apparent as one 
goes along advance through time. 
 
**  Privatization and Performance: Cognitive and Behavioral Governance,Review 
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 2(3): pp. 46-58. 
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As for the other control variables, except for the ROA that is always connected in a positive and highly 
significant way to Tobin's Q, they are in most cases not significant; this can be explained by the reduced number of 
observations in cross sections compared to that of "pooled estimate," which is generating more meaningful results. 
4.5. Analysis for different levels of the residual state ownership 
To summarize, the structure of state ownership is found then non-linearly related to the performance and to value 
creation and this relationship is convex. It would be interesting to highlight the most appropriate ownership structure 
in the privatized company. Thus the structure of public / private ownership is classified into 4 groups:  
 A group controlled by the private defined as having less than 10% share of public ownership ; 
 Joint Monitoring Group in which there are 10% to 30% of public ownership structure ; 
 Another group with mixed control in which it was from 30% to 50% share of public ownership; 
 A group controlled by the state in which public ownership share exceeds 50%.  
 
Table.8 Regressions of stock market performance for different levels of the state ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin 
     
STATE 2.544 
(0.49) 
 
0.803 
(0.50) 
0.556 
(1.23) 
6.130*** 
(4.31) 
 
IND 0.412* 
(1.87) 
 
0.399** 
(2.05) 
0.393** 
(2.15) 
0.000 
 
CAC 0.215 
(0.99) 
 
0.188 
(0.94) 
0.158 
(0.93) 
1.090*** 
(3.31) 
 
SIZE -0.404** 
(-2.16) 
-0.398** 
(-2.35) 
-0.373** 
(-2.50) 
-1.055** 
(-2.62) 
 
ROA 4.603*** 
(4.80) 
4.446*** 
(5.03) 
 
4.486*** 
(5.52) 
8.219*** 
(4.49) 
 
LEVERAGE 0.027 
(0.44) 
 
0.026 
(0.45) 
0.021 
(0.40) 
1.373 
(1.29) 
 
Constant 1.469** 
(2.30) 
1.488** 
(2.54) 
1.413*** 
(2.69) 
0.380 
(0.27) 
     
Observations 112 125 145 16 
R-squared 0.340 0.339 0.340 0.782 
     
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table.9 Regressions of accounting performance (ROA, ROE) for different levels of the state ownership 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROA 
     
STATE -0.326 
(-0.63) 
-0.381** 
(-2.38) 
 
-0.129** 
(-2.15) 
0.970** 
(2.40) 
 
IND 0.071*** 
(3.61) 
0.061*** 
(3.36) 
 
0.060*** 
(3.43) 
0.000 
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The following of Table.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in Table.8 and Table.9 confirm and consolidate the convex relationship already discerned. In fact for 
very low levels of public ownership (<10%), the impact is found no significant with all measures of performance 
and with the measure of value creation. However, for the second group of mixed ownership for which there is 10% 
to 30% of public ownership structure, the impact is negative and significant for ROA and ROE with respective 
levels of 5% and 1% and respective coefficients of -0.381 and            -2.360. We also found the same result for the 
negative (-0.129) and significant at the 5% level.  
Finally, the fourth group of public ownership in which ownership shares are above 50%, is actually associated 
with positive coefficients (0.970 for ROA and 6.130 for Tobin's Q) and highly significant at the respective levels of 
5% and 1%. This supports further the already positive relationship found between the variable STATE2 and 
performance. 
Hence the convex relationship is still approved through these results. It is consistent with that found by Ng et al 
(2009), whose arguments advanced to explain such result were the following:  
- The fact that these companies of mixed control are not receiving effective control, because neither the state nor 
private landowners have property enough to participate fully in the performance. This is particularly true when there 
are several minority investors in these companies; that is the case for French enterprises.  
- These firms face more ambiguity and conflicting between the firm's profit maximization objectives against the 
welfare state objectives.  
CAC -0.024 
(-1.15) 
-0.017 
(-0.85) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
0.087* 
(1.88) 
 
 
SIZE -0.040** 
(-2.36) 
 
-0.040** 
(-2.56) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.228*** 
(-4.83) 
 
Constant 0.182*** 
(3.01) 
0.188*** 
(3.31) 
0.201*** 
(3.84) 
0.411 
(1.73) 
 
Observations 112 125 139 16 
R-squared 0.221 0.222 0.215 0.715 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROE ROE ROE ROE 
     
STATE 
 
-1.593 
(-0.55) 
 
-2.360*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.551 
(-1.62) 
4.368 
(0.40) 
IND 
 
0.225** 
(2.06) 
 
0.176* 
(1.72) 
0.166* 
(1.67) 
0.000 
CAC 
 
-0.240** 
(-2.10) 
 
-0.200* 
(-1.83) 
-0.127 
(-1.28) 
-0.201 
(-0.16) 
SIZE 
 
-0.055 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.049 
(-0.55) 
-0.090 
(-1.11) 
-1.083 
(-0.85) 
Constant 0.368 
(1.10) 
0.368 
(1.15) 
0.470 
(1.58) 
1.833 
(0.29) 
     
Observations 112 125 139 16 
R-squared 0.107 0.118 0.086 0.164 
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- They also face more ambiguity about property rights, where control rights and income are distributed less 
clearly between the owners who are required to exercise effective governance within the company. 
I can add to these arguments, while referring to the theory of cognitive and behavioral governance, the likely 
emergence of cognitive conflicts between former leaders who continue to make management practices on the public 
company and new shareholders seeking private goals rather than profit maximization.  
          So to recapitulate, we can say that the structure of ownership and control in privatized French companies 
must be clear to be associated with greater performance and generate value creation. In addition, high levels of 
property either public or private are associated with high levels of performance. 
However, a question arises: what are the reasons for which the state seeks to retain a share of ownership in 
certain companies over others? We will try to answer this question in the next section. 
4.6. Determinants of the residual state ownership 
We'll start first by examining the bi-varied correlations between variables in order to evade the problem of multi 
collinearity. We will test the influence of the following variables on each other: Q: market performance; ROA: 
economic performance; STRA IND: strategic industry; LEVERAGE, the debt ratio; IND: the industry of the firm; 
CAC: belonging or not to the CAC40, and SIZE: The size of the firm. 
 
Table.10 Correlation matrix and VIF test 
 
 Q  ROA IND 
STRA  
LEVERAGE CAC SIZE VIF 
Q  1      1.53 
ROA 0.533 1     1.57 
IND STRA 0.024 0.019 1    1.24 
LEVERAGE -0.181 -0.159 0.247 1   1.39 
CAC -0.056 -0.194 -0.050 -0.152 1  1.77 
SIZE -0.281 -0.389 0.128 0.216 0.580 1 2.08 
 
The Table.10 outlines the various correlations. This matrix indicates that the level of correlation between 
independent variables is low. This result was corroborated by the VIF test whose values are below 2.08.  
 
Table .11 outlines the  regression of the structure of state ownership (STATE), measured by the percentage of 
ownership shares held by the State on the following variables: the stock market performance measured by Tobin's 
Q, accounting performance measured by ROA (Return on Assets);  size (SIZE) measured by the logarithm of sales; 
debt (LEVERAGE), measured by the ratio of debts;  Industry (STRA IND), binary variable = 1 if the company is 
one of eight strategic areas identified above and 0 otherwise; membership in the CAC 40 (CAC), binary variable = 1 
if the company is part of the CAC40 index and 0 otherwise; Interaction variable (IND STRA * SIZE); interaction 
variable . Number of observations is 155. The t values are in parentheses. The other numbers represent the 
correlation coefficients. 
  The estimated regression equation is as follows: 
STATEi,t = 0 + 1 Q Tobin + 2 ROAi,t + 3 SIZEi,t + 4 IND STRA i,t + 5 LEVERAGEi,t + 6 CACi,t + 7 (IND 
STRA* SIZE) + 8 (CAC*SIZE) +  i,t 
 
Table.11 Regression of the determinants of the residual state ownership  
 
Dependant Variable                      (1) 
                                 STATE 
(2) 
STATE 
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Independant Variables    
 
Q Tobin 
 
0.065*** 
(3.69) 
 
 
0.068*** 
(3.90) 
ROA -0.487** 
(-2.52) 
-0.485** 
(-2.53) 
 
IND STR 0.021 
(0.71) 
0.355* 
(1.93) 
 
SIZE 0.127*** 
(3.86) 
0.156*** 
(3.33) 
 
CAC -0.059 
(-1.60) 
-0.770** 
(-2.43) 
 
LEVERAGE -0.025** 
(-2.18) 
-0.016 
(-1.41) 
 
IND STR*SIZE 
 
 -0.098** 
(-2.01) 
CAC*SIZE 
 
 
Constant                                        
 
 
 
 
 
-0.349*** 
(-2.99) 
0.178** 
(2.25) 
 
-0.460*** 
(-2.70) 
R-Squared 0.190 0.234 
Note: *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Table.11 displays the regression results on determinants of the residual state ownership in newly privatized 
French companies. The estimates were made by the method of ordinary least squares and they were established in 
two stages: First stage estimation does not include the interaction variables (IND STRA x SIZE) and (CAC*SIZE); 
and a second one by adding these variables in our equation. We have noticed through the second estimate that the 
model's explanatory power improves as well as the significance of the explanatory variables coefficients.  
In order of importance, the CAC variable has the largest coefficient (-0.770). CAC is negatively and significantly 
related to the state ownership at the 5% level. This implies that the state abandons the property in companies 
belonging to the CAC40. However, the positive coefficient on the interaction variable (CAC * SIZE) leads us to 
conclude that the larger companies and belonging to the CAC40 tend to have more shares of state property. Clearly, 
the state retains ownership of shares in companies belonging to the CAC40, only when they are large. 
The variable accounting performance measured by ROA has also an important coefficient (-0487). The ROA is 
negatively and significantly related to the structure of public ownership at the 5% level. This implies that the French 
government seeks to retain ownership shares in less profitable companies and release control in the most profitable 
companies in order to increase revenues from privatization; this being in agreement with the fact that the French 
government chose to privatize the more profitable companies to increase revenues from privatization and to fill its 
budget deficit.  
Market performance measured by Tobin's Q is positively related to state ownership with a low coefficient 
(0.068)) and significant at the 1% level. This reflects the influence of market performance on the state's decision 
regarding the detention of ownership shares into firms with good market performance. 
Strategic industry variable (STRA IND) is related positively and significantly at 10% level to state ownership 
with a coefficient of 0.35. This result implies that the state wants to retain ownership shares in companies that are 
part of strategic industries. Add to this a negative coefficient and significant at less than 10% for the interaction 
variable SIZE X STRA IND. This result suggests that the state retains ownership of shares in the less wide 
companies belonging to the strategic sectors. This can be explained by the fact that it is possible that firms in these 
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sectors are generally smaller in size compared to those belonging to other sectors. This result is consistent with that 
found by Ng & al (2009) for the mining companies. 
The size variable is positively and highly significantly related at the 0.000% level to public ownership with a 
coefficient of 0.156. This implies that state ownership is greater for larger companies. This can be explained by the 
fact that public enterprises are generally larger than private firms hence they tend to have larger shares of 
government property. 
This is consistent with our expectations and implies that the state ownership is greater for larger companies because 
they employ more people and pursue important goals of social welfare. More than that, those companies need more 
government protection (Wei & Varela, 2003). 
The coefficient of leverage is found negative (very low coefficient of -0.025) and significant at 5%. This provides 
support for the proposition that high levels of indebtedness in SOEs are related to low participation of the State in its 
shares; this arises from the fact that the state found in the abandonment of its ownership in these companies a way to 
save them from their financial difficulties. 
To summarize, we can emerge from the foregoing, that all the specified factors in our regression are determinants 
of the state ownership structure. The most important are those with the largest and most significant factors namely 
ROA, CAC, and the firm size. 
5. Conclusion 
For a long time, previous studies have focused their analysis on the examination of the impact of privatization on 
performance. The majority of findings were in favor of a positive impact of privatization on performance thereby 
confirming the inefficiency of public enterprises. It is only recently, that several researchers have refocused their 
analysis to the consideration of the impact of the state ownership including minority within privatized enterprises. 
Some of them lead to the fact that this property, for some levels, can have positive effects on performance. Such 
results are consolidated with our findings in this study.  
Hence, a too low level of state ownership will be associated with a decrease in performance and value creation, 
while high levels even higher than 50% are associated with improved performance and value creation. Therefore, 
that it is public or private, to be associated with higher levels of performance, ownership structure should be high. 
Having said that, ownership rights and control are clearly defined. In addition, the meeting of several stakeholders in 
the privatized company generates the cognitive transfer via governance mechanisms to residual state owners, hence 
the positive impact on performance.  
Concerning the issue of the determinants of such public ownership in the privatized French companies, our 
results leads to the fact that the French government keeps shares of ownership in less profitable and less leveraged 
companies and in those making part of strategic sectors. Moreover, this participation is higher among largest 
companies and those belonging to the CAC40 index. The state also retains shares of ownership in companies with 
high value creation, although the coefficient associated with this variable seems too low.  
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